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BowEN v. CouNTY oF Los ANGELES

[L. A. No. 22012.

In Bank.

[39 C.2d

Oct. 17, 1952.]

MARJORIE A. BOWEN, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-Oath required of all public
employees by the Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109)
does not constitute a religious or political test.
[2] Id.-Oath-Rules Governing.-The loyalty of county employees
is not exclusively a local affair but is a matter of general statewide concern, and the Levering Act (Gov. Code,§§ 3100-3109),
which fully occupies the field of legislation on the subject of
loyalty oaths for all public employees, is applicable to county
employees and precludes the imposition of supplementary local
requirements.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel county to reinstate
a civil service employee and pay compensation withheld following suspension for refusal to sign oath required by Gov.
Code, §§ 3100-3109. Writ granted in part.
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Richard W. Petherbridge and Nanette Dembitz for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly, Assistant County Counsel and Robert L. Trapp, Deputy County
Counsel, for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Petitioner, a Los Angeles County civil
service employee, was discharged because she refused to sign
the oath required of all public employees by the Levering Act
(Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109), and she has brought this original
proceeding in mandamus seeking reinstatement and payment
of compensation which was withheld following her suspension.
Before the Levering Act went into effect, petitioner executed an oath almost identical with that prescribed in section
3 of article XX of the state Constitution, and she also took the
oath and made the affidavits required by the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County.* Thereafter she was directed
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, §52; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§ 7.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2) Public Employees.
*See Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 698 [249 P.2d
287].
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[39 C.2d 714; 249 P.2d 285]

by her superior to take the oath prescribed by the Levering
Act, and upon her refusal to do so she was suspended without
pay as of October 30 and was discharged on November 29, 1950.
Nearly all of the questions raised by petitioner with respect
to the constitutionality and application of the Levering Act
have been answered adversely to her in Packman v Leonard,
ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267]. She makes two additional
contentions, however, with respect to asserted conflicts between
the act and the provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter.
[1] 'l'he :first of these, namely that the oath requirement violates section 41 of the charter,* falls by reason of our holding
in the Pockman case, ante, at p. 686, that the Levering
oath does not constitute a religious or political test.
[2] Secondly, petitioner contends that the Levering Act
is inapplicable to her because, she asserts, the power to regulate
the qualifications of county employees is governed exclusively
by the provisions of the Los Angeles County Charter adopted
pursuant to section 7¥2 of article XI of the state Constitution
which authorizes county charters to provide for the regulation by boards of supervisors of the appointment, duties, qualifications and compensation of county employees. Under the
charter the board of supervisors is empowered to provide for
the appointment and compensation of county employees, a civil
service system is set up, and the power to prescribe rules
for the classified service is vested in a county commission.
(L.A. County Charter, §§ 11, 34.) There is nothing in section
7lh, however, which can be construed as in any way limiting
the authority of the Legislature to make regulations under
its police power concerning the loyalty of persons in the service of the state and its political subdivisions. We held
in Packman v. Leonard, ante, pp. 676, 686 [249 P.2d 267],
that the Levering Act was adopted by the Legislature in
the exercise of its police power, and there can be no doubt
that the loyalty of ·county employees is not exclusively a
local affair but is a matter of general statewide concern.
It follows that the Levering Act is applicable to employees of Los Angeles County, and it is evident from the
language and purpose of the act that it fully occupies the
:field of legislation on the subject of loyalty oaths for public
employees. ( Cf. Fraser v. Regents of University of Califor*Section 41 provides: "No person in the [county] classified service,
or seeking admission thereto, shall be appointed, reduced or removed or
in any way favored or discriminated against because of his political or
religions opinions or affiliations,''
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nia, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283]; Tolman v. Underhill,
ante, p. 708 [249 P.2d 280] .) The act establishes a general and detailed plan with uniform standards for all public
employees, and, as we have held in the Tolman ca~e, ante, at
p. 713, with respect to earlier statutes the act precludes the
imposition of supplementary local requirements. The oath
prescribed by the Levering Act is, therefore, the only oath or
declaration relating to loyalty which may now be required
of Los Angeles County employees as a condition of their
employment. (Of. Fraser v. Regents of University of California, post, pp. 717, 718 [249 P.2d 283].)
Since petitioner refused to execute the Levering oath,
she is not entitled to reinstatement. She is, however, entitled
to compensation for services rendered up to and including
30 days following October 3, 1950, the effective date of the
Levering Act. (Packman v. Leonard, ante, pp. 676, 688
[249 P.2d 267] .)
Petitioner's application for a writ directing her reinstatement as a civil service employee is denied. Let a writ of
mandate issue for the limited purpose of directing payment of
petitioner's salary up to and including 30 days after October
3, 1950.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pockman v. Leonard, this day filed, ante, p. 688 [249 P.2d 267],
I would issue a writ of mandate as prayed for in the petition.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 14, 1952. Carter, ,T., was, of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

